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COPYRIGHT LIABILITY FOR PERFORMANCES OF
MUSICAL WORKS: USE OF BACKGROUND RADIO
MUSIC IN THE AFTERMATH OF TWENTIETH
CENTURY MUSIC CORP. V. AIKEN
The promotion of federal copyright protection for the products of
creative activity inherently involves conflicts between the interests of creators
and the public interest.' While the assurance of unrestricted access to creative
works is desirable public policy, federal copyright law restricts public access
to creative works by granting to creators limited exclusive rights in creative
works. 2 Although grants of exclusive rights provide an economic incentive
for continued creative activity, the resulting monopoly power of creators
over creative works is inconsistent with the classical economic goal of
maximum competition. 3 The empowering copyright clause of the Constitution
recognizes the inherent conflicts between the interests of creators and the
public interest by giving Congress the power "to promote the progress of
science and useful arts by securing for limited times to authors and inventors
the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries."
'4
While the Constitution relies entirely on the economic incentive of
exclusive rights grants to ensure continued creative activity, the federal
1. See L. SELTZER, EXEMPTIONS AND FAIR USE IN COPYRIGHT: THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS
TENSIONS IN THE 1976 COPYRIGHT ACT 3 (1978) (discussion of conflicts inherent in federal
copyright protection policy). Under federal copyright law, competition between creators' interests
and the public interest arises over public access to creative works and the economic cost to the
public of creative works. See id.
2. See id. (tension exists between desirability of unrestricted public access to creative
works and effect of federal copyright law to restrict public access to creative works).
3. See id. (tension exists between economic goal of maximum competition and monopoly
power of creators over creative works).
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. "Science" in the empowering copyright clause of the
Constitution refers to knowledge in general. See L. SELTZER, supra note 1, at 8 n.25.
The copyright clause implies that Congress should encourage creative activity by granting
to creators limited exclusive rights to their work that restrict public access to the creative works.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Proponents of the view that federal copyright policy permits
an unwarranted monopoly assert that in restricting competition, copyright creates a "monopoly
subsidy" to the copyright owner in the form of higher prices for copyrighted works. See L.
SELTZER, supra note 1, at 4-5. Moreover, the higher cost of copyrighted works outweighs any
benefit to the public by way of accessibility to creative works. See id. Proponents of the view
that copyright creates a monopoly subsidy also advance a microeconomic argument against
granting exclusive rights. See id. at 5. Like any other good, the argument proceeds, the creative
work is subject to the market forces of supply, demand, and price. See id. See generally L.
SCHWARTZ, J. FLYNN & H. FIRST, FREE ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC ORGAN17ATIONS: ANTITRUST
935 (1983) (discussing effect on public access to creative works of patent and copyright laws in
authorizing Congress to grant monopolies in discoveries and writings). The copyright clause
recognizes and attempts to mitigate the effect of the creator's monopoly power by limiting the
duration of the creator's exclusive rights in his creative work. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
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WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:245
copyright statutes have not placed complete reliance on limiting grants of
exclusive rights in creative works to ensure public accessibility to creative
works.5 Congress provides statutory exemptions from copyright protection
when the copyright scheme working alone does not provide adequate public
access to creative works. 6 For example, the Copyright Act of 19097 (1909
Act) exempted from copyright protection the production of phonograph
records of copyrighted music, 8 any nonprofit performances of musical works
and riondramatic literary works, 9 and the playing of records on coin-operated
machines.10 Technological advances in communication during the years be-
tween enactment of the 1909 Act and enactment of the Copyright Act of
1976" (1976 Act) were responsible for a marked increase in exemptions in
the 1976 Act.' 2 In enacting the 1976 Act, Congress identified thirty-three
circumstances that warranted exemptions from copyright protection. 3 Twenty-
seven of the 1976 Act exemptions from copyright protection fall either in
the category of copying and recording exemptions, 4 or in the category of
5. See L. SELTZER, supra note 1, at 12 (discussion of statutory departure from constitu-
tional basis of copyright scheme). The Constitution is unique in its unconditional reliance on
the inner workings of the copyright design to ensure public access to creative works. See id.
The English Statute of Anne, which provided the model for copyright law in the United States,
qualified the grant of exclusive rights to authors. See 8 Anne, ch. 19 (1709). For example, any
Englishman who thought that the price of a book was too high could bring an action before a
tribunal. See id. The tribunal had the power to lower the price of the book and to fine the
bookseller. See id. In the United States between 1783 and 1786, the individual states enacted
copyright statutes. See L. SELTZER, supra note 1, at 11. For example, the state legislatures of
Connecticut, Georgia, New York, North Carolina, and South Carolina provided for state
control of access to copyrighted works or of prices that copyright owners may charge, or of
both access and price. See id. at 11 n.38. The Constitution has no provision for fedeial
supervision of access or of price beyond the authorization of Congress to grant limited exclusive
rights to creators. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
6. See L. SELTZER, supra note 1, at 1-2 (rationale behind statutory exemptions from
copyright liability). Statutory exemptions from copyright liability represent a congressional
decision that under certain circumstances, the existing copyright scheme will not produce a
result beneficial to the public. See id. Thus, Congress exempts certain uses of copyrighted works
from the requirement that users make royalty payments to copyright owners or obtain permission
from copyright owners to use copyrighted works. See id.
7. 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (current version at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1982)).
8. See id. § 1(e). The Copyright Act of 1909 (1909 Act) exempted production of
phonograph records of copyrighted music only if the parties producing phonograph records had
obtained compulsory licenses and had paid the statutory fees. See id.
9. Id. § 104.
10. Id. § l(e).
11. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1982).
12. See L. SELTZER, supra note 1, at 50 (discussing need for modification of copyright
scheme in response to technological change prior to enactment of Copyright Act of 1976 (1976
Act)). For example, photocopying machines and tape recorders have increased the public's
copying capability, while the public access to aural and visual forms of copyrighted work has
increased by means of retransmission of signals from the air or from recordings. See id.
13. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-116, 118 (1982) (1976 Act exemptions
from copyright protection).
14. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-113, 115 (1982); see L. SELTZER, supra note
1, at 53 (categorizing thirty-three 1976 Act exemptions). An example of an exemption in the
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performing and displaying exemptions. 15 The remaining 1976 Act exemptions
involve issues such as fair use, 16 performing rights in sound recordings,
17 and
certain secondary transmissions.' 8
The exemptions for secondary transmissions originated in the litigation
in the federal courts prior to enactment of the 1976 Act.'
9 Cases arising
Copyright Act of 1976 (1976 Act) falling into the category of copying and recording exemptions
involves libraries with collections available to the public or for specialized research. See
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 108(a)(2).
The libraries may, without paying royalty fees to copyright owners and without obtaining
the copyright owners' permission, make copies of damaged or deteriorating works in the
libraries' own collections if a new work is not available at a reasonable price. See id. § 108(c).
The copying, however, must not result in direct or indirect commercial benefit to the libraries.
See id. § 108(a)(l).
15. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 107, 109-112, 116, 118 (1982); see L. SELTZER,
supra note I, at 53 (categorizing thirty-three 1976 Act exemptions). An example of a 1976 Act
exemption that falls into the category of exemptions for performances and displays allows
governmental bodies or nonprofit agricultural or horticultural organizations to perform non-
dramatic musical works at annual agricultural or horticultural fairs. See Copyright Act of 1976,
17 U.S.C. § 110(b).
16. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982); see L. SELTZER, supra note I, at 53
(categorizing thirty-three 1976 Act exemptions). The exemptions in the Copyright Act of 1976
(1976 Act) relating to fair use are not technically exemptions, but rather are implied rights to
use copyrighted works under certain circumstances without obtaining the permission of copyright
owners. See id. at 1. Legislative history indicates that Congress intended the fair use doctrine
to apply in educational contexts. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65-74 (1976)
(congressional discussion of general background of fair use problem, general intention behind
fair use provision in 1976 Act, and intention regarding classroom reproduction of copyrighted
works), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5678-88 [hereinafter cited as
1976 HousE REPORT].
17. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 114 (1982); see L. SELTZER, supra note 1, at 53
(categorizing thirty-three 1976 Act exemptions). A sound recording is a purely aural work and
is distinguishable from a "musical work," which is the underlying musical material and not a
recording of the material. See A. LATmAN, THE COPYRIGHT LAW: HOwEL's COPYRIGHT LAW
REVISED AND Tm 1976 ACT 62 (5th ed. 1979) (distinguishing musical work and sound recording).
The copyright owner of a sound recording does not have the exclusive right to perform the
recording. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 114 (scope of exclusive rights in sound
recordings); see also M. NIMMER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF LITERARY, MUSICAL AND ARTISTIC
PROPERTY, AND THE PROTECTION OF IDEAS § 8.14, at 8-135 (1985) (copyright owner of sound
recording does not have exclusive performance right). Thus, the 1976 Act effectively exempts
from copyright protection performances of sound recordings. See L. SELTZER, supra note 1, at
60.
18. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 111 (1982); see L. SELTZER, supra note 1, at 53
(categorizing thirty-three 1976 Act Exemptions). Secondary transmissions are further transmis-
sions of primary transmissions that occur simultaneously with the primary transmissions. See
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 111 (defining transmissions). A transmitting facility makes
a primary transmission when it sends broadcast signals to a secondary transmission service for
further transmission. See id. Transmissions of performances or displays occur when any device
or process communicates the performances or displays for reception in the form of images and
sounds beyond the place from which a transmitting facility sends broadcast signals. See id. §
101 (defining transmission). One 1976 Act exemption relating to secondary transmissions permits
a hotel, apartment house, or any similar establishment to retransmit a local Federal Commu-
nications Commission licensed radio or television signal to private rooms unless the establishment
makes an extra charge for the retransmission. See id. § 1 l(a)(l).
19. See infra notes 20-22 and accompanying text (review of case precedent, prior to
19861
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under the 1909 Act concerned whether secondary transmissions constituted
potentially infringing performances of copyrighted aural and visual works. 20
enactment of 1976 Act, relating to secondary transmissions).
20. See, e.g., Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 162-64 (1975)
(radio reception of broadcast of copyrighted musical compositions did not constitute perform-
ance of compositions); Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394,
408-09 (1974) (cable television system did not perform broadcast of copyrighted material);
Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 400-01 (1968) (same); Buck
v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 201 (1931) (hotel proprietor performed copyrighted
musical compositions for guests); Society of European Stage Authors and Composers, Inc. v.
New York Hotel Statler Co., 19 F. Supp. 1, 4-5 (S.D.N.Y. 1937) (same); see also Copyright
Act of 1909, § l(e), 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (1909 Act did not provide definition of performance).
Until Congress enacted the Copyright Act of 1976 (1976 Act), the federal courts struggled to
give some meaning to the term "perform." See generally Note, The Meaning of "Performance"
Under the Copyright Act, Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975), 7 U.
TOL. L. REv. 705, 710-20 (1976) (discussion of case precedent, prior to enactment of 1976 Act,
relating to activities constituting performance under 1909 Act) [hereinafter cited as Note, The
Meaning of "Performance"]; 80 DICK. L. R-v. 328, 329-33 (1976) (same).
In examining certain secondary transmissions to determine whether a performance had
occurred, the United States Supreme Court in Jewell-LaSalle found that a hotel proprietor, who
played copyrighted musical compositions for guests by means of a radio receiving set and
loudspeakers, performed the musical compositions. Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S.
191, 201 (1931). Similarly, in Hotel Statler, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York held that a hotel performed a copyrighted musical composition by
employing two master radio receiving sets connected to guests' bedrooms. Society of European
Stage Authors and Composers, Inc. v. New York Hotel Statler Co., 19 F. Supp. 1, 4-5
(S.D.N.Y. 1937).
In Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., however, the United States Supreme
Court held that cable television system operators did not perform the programs that the cable
systems received and carried. Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390,
400-01 (1968). In another case involving cable television systems, the Supreme Court held that
cable television system reception and retransmission of broadcast signals, whether from local
or from distant sources, did not amount to a performance of a broadcast or copyrighted
material. See Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 408-09
(1974). In 1975, the Supreme Court found that the owner of a fast food restaurant did not
perform copyrighted musical works when the owner played radio music over home-quality
equipment for the enjoyment of employees and customers of the restaurant. See Twentieth
Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 162-64 (1975).
In determining whether a performance qualifying for copyright protection under the 1909
Act had occurred, the courts traditionally applied either a quantitative or functional test. See
Note, The Meaning of "Performance," supra, at 712-17 (application of quantitative and
functional tests to determine occurrence of performance). Courts relying on the quantitative
test of performance examined the extent of an alleged copyright infringer's contribution to the
ultimate reception of music. See id. at 713. For example, the United States Supreme Court in
Jewell-LaSalle found that by using a radio receiving set with connected loudspeakers, a hotel
proprietor had provided all of the equipment necessary for reception and, therefore, had
performed copyrighted musical compositions. See Jewell-LaSalle, 283 U.S. at 201. Similarly, in
Society of European Stage Authors and Composers, Inc. v. New York Hotel Statler Co., the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York found that a hotel using
two master radio receiving sets connected to loudspeakers in guests' bedrooms performed a
copyrighted musical composition. See Hotel Statler, 19 F. Supp. at 4-5.
Courts relying on the functional test of performance examined the activities of alleged
copyright infringers and characterized them as either broadcasting or viewing activities. See
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In Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 2' the United States Supreme
Court found that the owner of a fast-food restaurant did not perform
copyrighted musical works by playing radio music over home-quality equip-
ment in the restaurant.22 To clarify the status of secondary transmissions
under federal copyright law, Congress explicitly defined "performance" in
the 1976 Act to include secondary transmissions of sounds or visual images.
23
Nevertheless, Congress recognized the need for an exemption in situations
like Aiken, in which small commercial establishments use equipment of the
type found in private homes to retransmit broadcasts of copyrighted aural
or visual works. 24 While section 110(5) of the 1976 Act codifies the "Aiken
exemption" of secondary transmissions of copyrighted works over home-
quality equipment, the statutory language is vague and imprecise. 2 The
legislative history of section 110(5), however, provides insight into the
congressional intent concerning the exemption. 26 Congress suggested circum-
stances relevant to the consideration of whether section 110(5) applies to a
particular commercial establishment.
27
Since enactment of the 1976 Act, only a few cases have arisen involving
the section 110(5) exemption.2 In deciding the few cases that have arisen to
date, the federal courts have not been consistent in finding particular
Note, The Meaning of "Performance," supra, at 714-15. Although broadcasting activities
constituted performances, viewing activities were not performances within the meaning of the
1909 Act. See Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 398-99. In Fortnightly, the Supreme Court found that
cable television systems merely were relaying to additional viewers television programs already
released to the public. See id. at 400-01. The cable systems were not engaging in broadcasting
activities and thus, were not performing the television programs. See id. The Supreme Court in
Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. found that even when cable television
systems originated programming in addition to providing reception service, the cable systems
were not performing. See Teleprompter, 415 U.S. at 405. In Aiken, the Supreme Court, refusing
to overrule the Fortnightly and Teleprompter decisions, held that radio reception of a broadcast
was not a performance. See Aiken, 422 U.S. at 162.
21. 422 U.S. 151 (1975).
22. Aiken, 422 U.S. at 164; see infra notes 33 and accompanying text (discussion of
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken).
23. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (1976 Act provided definition of
performance).
24. See infra notes 63-64 and accompanying text (1976 Act exempted from copyright
infringement liability public reception of transmissions of sound or visual images on home-
quality equipment).
25. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (1982) (codifying Aiken exemption);
see also infra notes 73-126 and accompanying text (demonstrating reasons for uncertainty of
certain establishments concerning potential copyright infringement liability).
26. See infra notes 65-68 and accompanying text (examining congressional intent regarding
§ 110(5) exemption from copyright infringement liability).
27. See 1976 HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 87 (circumstances significant in determining
applicability of § 110(5) exemption); see also infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text (discussing
Congress' suggestions of circumstances relevant to applicability of § 110(5) exemption).
28. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. United States Shoe Corp., 678 F.2d 816, 817-18 (9th
Cir. 1982) (chain of stores liable for infringement of exclusive performance right related to
copyrighted musical works); Sailor Music v. The Gap Stores, Inc., 668 F.2d 84, 86 (2d Cir.
19861
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circumstances as determinative of liability for copyright infringement. 29 In
addition, several of the circumstances on which the courts have focused to
assess copyright liability required the courts to make arbitrary or subjective
determinations.30 The effect of judicial inconsistency and subjectivity is to
force establishments that wish to provide radio music for customer enjoyment
to operate under conditions of considerable uncertainty concerning potential
copyright liability.3" The Supreme Court recognized the unique problems of
small commercial establishments that feature background music in Twentieth
Century Music Corp. v. Aiken. a2 In Aiken, the defendant George Aiken was
the owner and operator of a small fast-service chicken restaurant in down-
town Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. 3  For the entertainment of his employees and
customers, Aiken had provided a radio in the restaurant.14 Aiken had
connected to the radio four speakers that he located in the ceiling of the
restaurant.3 5 Throughout each business day, employees and customers heard
radio station broadcasts of music, news, entertainment, and commercial
advertising. 36 Aiken tuned the radio to a local station that featured two
copyrighted musical compositions during a broadcast.3 7 The copyright owners
of each of the musical works were members of the American Society of
Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP)3 8 The radio station that
1981) (same), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 945 (1982). Laminations Music v. P & X Markets, Inc.,
1985 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 25,790 (N.D. Cal. April 24, 1985) (same); Springsteen v.
Plaza Roller Dome, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1113, 1119 (M.D.N.C. 1985) (miniature golf course did
not infringe exclusive performance right); see also infra notes 126 and accompanying text
(review of case precedent relating to § 110(5) exemption and demonstrating federal courts'
inconsistency in finding particular circumstances determinative of copyright liability).
29. See infra notes 73-108 and accompanying text (review of case precedent relating to §
110(5) exemption and demonstrating federal courts' inconsistency in finding particular circum-
stances determinative of copyright liability).
30. See infra notes 109-126 and accompanying text (review of case precedent relating to
§ 110(5) exemption and discussion of federal courts' focus on circumstances requiring courts to
make arbitrary or subjective determinations).
31. See infra notes 73-126 and accompanying text (demonstrating reasons for uncertainty
of certain establishments concerning potential copyright infringement liability).
32. 422 U.S. 151 (1975). See Copyright Act of 1909, § 1(e), 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (granting
copyright owner of musical work exclusive right to perform work publicly for profit). In
addition to the exclusive right to perform the work publicly for profit, the 1909 Act granted to
the copyright owner of a musical work the exclusive right to print, reprint, publish, copy, and
vend the copyrighted work, and the exclusive right to arrange or to adapt the copyrighted work.
See id. §§ l(a), 1(b); see also infra notes 56-62 and accompanying text (discussing origins of §
110(5) exemption from copyright infringement liability).
33. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. at 152 (discussion of Aiken
factual situation). In Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, Aiken's fast-service chicken
restaurant offered both carry-out and sit-down services. Id. Customers who chose to eat in the




37. Id. at 152-53.
38. Id. at 153. The American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP)
is a performing rights society. See M. NIMMER, supra note 18, § 8.19, at 8-238 (discussion of
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broadcast the music had obtained a license from ASCAP to perform both
musical works, but Aiken had not obtained ASCAP's permission to perform
either of the compositions.39 The copyright owners of the musical works
brought suit against Aiken to recover for copyright infringement.4 The
owners alleged that Aiken had violated the owners' exclusive rights to
perform the works publicly for profit.
4'
The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
agreed with the copyright owners and awarded each of the owners the
statutory money judgment for infringement. 42 On appeal, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the district court judgment.
43
The Third Circuit relied on the United States Supreme Court's holdings in
Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc.44 and Teleprompter Corp.
v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.45 that cable television system opera-
tors did not perform copyrighted programs within the meaning of the 1909
Act by receiving and retransmitting broadcast signals of the programs." The
copyright owners appealed the Third Circuit's decision to the United States
Supreme Court.4 7 In addressing the issue of performance in Aiken, the
Supreme Court noted and declined to overrule the Fortnightly and Tele-
prompter decisions. 4 The Supreme Court recognized the analogy the Third
performing rights societies). ASCAP licenses the nondramatic performing rights of its members
in musical works. See id. A nondramatic performance of a musical work occurs when the
musical work does not help to tell a story. See Timberg, The Antitrust Aspects of ferchandising
Modern Music: The ASCAP Consent Judgment of 1950, 19 LAw & CoraMP. PRoBs. 294, 296
n.6 (1954) (examining network television license agreement between ASCAP and ASCAP's
licensees). Founded in 1914, ASCAP's function is to enforce collectively the performance rights
of songwriters and publishers, whose rights are difficult to enforce on an individual basis due
to the extensive performance of musical works. See M. Nm14NMR, supra note 18, § 8.19, at 8-
238 (discussion of performing rights societies).
39. Aiken, 422 U.S. at 153.
40. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 356 F. Supp. 271, 272 (W.D. Pa. 1973),
rev'd, 500 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1974), aff'd, 422 U.S. 151 (1975).
41. Aiken, 422 U.S. at 153.
42. Aiken, 356 F. Supp. at 275 (awarding statutory money judgment of $250 to each
plaintiff). The Copyright Act of 1909 (1909 Act) authorized a court to use discretion in assessing
damages for infringements related to musical compositions, but recommended damages of $10
for every infringing performance of copyrighted musical compositions. See Copyright Act of
1909, § 101(b), 35 Stat. 1075 (1909).
43. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 500 F.2d 127, 137 (3d Cir. 1974), rev'g 356
F. Supp. 271, 275 (W.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd, 422 U.S. 151 (1973).
44. 392 U.S. 390 (1968); see supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussion of
Fortnightly in connection with federal courts' struggle to give meaning to term "perform" prior
to enactment of 1976 Act).
45. 415 U.S. 394 (1974); see supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussion of
Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys, Inc. in connection with federal courts'
struggle to give meaning to term "perform" prior to enactment of 1976 Act).
46. See Teleprompter, 415 U.S. at 408-09 (cable television system operators did not
perform programs received and carried); Fortnightly, Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc.,
392 U.S. at 400-01 (same).
47. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975).
48. See id. at 162 (refusing to overrule prior decisions on grounds of stare decisis doctrine);
19861
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Circuit drew from the cable television systems decisions. 49 The Third Circuit
had asserted that if the cable television systems that employed technologically
advanced equipment did not perform the television broadcasts that the
systems received and retransmitted, then Aiken did not perform radio
broadcasts by receiving transmissions of the broadcasts on home-quality
equipment.50 The Supreme Court advanced the additional argument that a
holding in Aiken that performance had taken place would apply to numerous
small commercial establishments nationwide.5 The Supreme Court reasoned
that enforcement of a licensing requirement against the numerous establish-
ments would be impractical and inequitable.22 A person in Aiken's position
had no control over a radio station's selection of music and, therefore, could
not obtain a license for each musical work featured during radio station
broadcasts.53 Moreover, requiring persons in Aiken's position to obtain
licenses covering radio broadcasts to avoid copyright liability would result in
multiple compensation to the copyright owners of musical works, assuming
that the radio stations also had obtained the necessary licenses.5 4 Accordingly,
the Supreme Court held that Aiken had not performed copyrighted musical
works by playing the radio in his restaurant and, therefore, had not violated
the copyright owners' exclusive performance rights."
The 1976 Act, which Congress enacted to revise the 1909 Act, reflects
congressional response to the Supreme Court's decision in Aiken that Aiken
had not performed the radio broadcast featuring copyrighted musical works.
56
Congress recognized that if the copyright owner of a musical work had the
exclusive right to perform the work, an express statutory definition of
performance was necessary to adequately protect the right. 57 The 1976 Act,
therefore, explicitly defines performance with language that includes the
reception of transmissions of broadcasted musical works.5" At the same time,
see also supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussion of Fortnightly and Teleprompter
decisions in connection with cases arising under 1909 Act concerning status of secondary
transmissions as performances).
49. See Aiken, 422 U.S. at 161 (reviewing Third circuit's reasoning for decision that
Aiken did not perform broadcasts of copyrighted music).
50. See Aiken, 500 F.2d at 137 (comparing cable television systems' receiving and
transmitting equipment to radio in Aiken's restaurant).
51. See Aiken, 422 U.S. at 162 (noting that Aiken holding would be applicable to
numerous establishments nationwide).
52. See id. (noting impracticality and inequitability of enforcing licensing requirement
against numerous small commercial establishments).
53. See id. (noting lack of public control over radio station selections of music).
54. See id. at 163 (noting that enforcing licensing requirement against small commercial
establishments would result in multiple compensation to copyright owners of musical works).
55. Id. at 164.
56. See infra notes 57-62 and accompanying text (tracing congressional response to
Supreme Court holding in Aiken).
57. See Copyright Act of 1909, § l(e), 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (granting copyright owner of
musical work exclusive right to perform work publicly for profit, but without providing
definition of performance).
58. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1972) (providing definition of perform-
ance). The 1976 Act, in providing a definition of performance, has precluded further litigation
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however, Congress recognized the validity of the Supreme Court's reasoning
in Aiken that the enforcement of a licensing requirement against small
commercial establishments that played radio music on the premises repre-
sented an instance in which the internal mechanisms of the federal copyright
scheme restricted public access to musical works. 9 A person in Aiken's
position could protect himself against copyright liability only by not using
the radio, a result that would be unjustified because radio stations presumably
held licenses to perform featured copyrighted musical works. 6 0 The purpose
of the copyright scheme is to provide economic incentives to ensure continued
creative activity but not to provide multiple compensation for creative
activity. 6' Accordingly, the 1976 Act included an exemption in section 110(5)
that applied to the public reception of transmissions of radio broadcasts. 62
Section 110(5) exempts from copyright infringement liability the public
reception of transmissions on equipment comparable to that used in private
homes. 63 The section 110(5) exemption does not apply, however, when the
public pays to hear or to see a broadcast of aural or visual works, or when
the public reception results from a retransmission of a broadcast.64 The
legislative history of the section 110(5) exemption indicates that Congress
intended that section 110(5) typically should apply to small commercial
establishments using a home-quality receiving set with no more than four
ordinary loudspeakers grouped in close proximity to the receiving set.
65
Although section 110(5) effectively codifies the Aiken decision, the legislative
history emphasizes that the Aiken fact situation represents the boundary of
the section 110(5) exemption. 66 Congress did not intend that the exemption
of what constitutes a performance qualifying for federal copyright protection. According to the
1976 Act, a person performs a work by directly or indirectly reciting, rendering, playingt
dancing, or acting the work. See id. Indirect means of performing include the use of any kind
of equipment that reproduces or amplifies sounds or visual images. See 1976 HousE REPORT,
supra note 15, at 63.
59. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text (discussion of Supreme Court's reasoning
that enforcement of licensing requirement against small commercial establishments would be
impractical and inequitable); see also supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text (general discussion
of federal copyright scheme).
60. See Aiken, 422 U.S. at 162-63 (noting that small commercial establishments must
keep radio turned off to avoid potential copyright liability and that licensing requirement would
result in multiple compensation to copyright owners of musical works).
61. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (grants of exclusive rights in copyrighted
works provide economic incentive for continued creative activity).
62. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (1982) (exemption from copyright
liability for public reception of transmissions on home-quality equipment); see also supra note
18 and accompanying text (providing definitions of transmissions).
63. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (provision in 1976 Act for statutory
exemption related to public reception of transmissions).
64. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (1982) (inapplicability of § 110(5)
exemption in specific instances).
65. See 1976 HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 87 (congressional intent regarding circum-
stances to which § 110(5) exemption should apply).
66. See id. (congressional intent regarding scope of § 110(5) exemption).
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apply to establishments in which the proprietor installed a commercial sound
system.67 The exemption also would be inapplicable to establishments in
which the proprietor converted a home-quality receiving set into the equiv-
alent of a commercial sound system by employing sophisticated or extensive
amplification equipment. 6 The legislative history suggests certain factual
circumstances that courts should consider in determining whether section
110(5) applies in a particular instance. 69 Relevant circumstances include the
size, physical arrangement, the noise level of the areas within an establishment
in which the reception of a broadcast occurs, and the extent to which the
proprietor has converted the receiving set to improve the aural or visual
quality of the broadcast.70 Congress, however, did not prioritize or elaborate
on the suggested circumstances, or limit determination of exempt status to
consideration of the suggested circumstances'.7 Congress thus granted to the
federal courts considerable discretion in determining the applicability of the
section 110(5) exemption to public receptions of transmissions.
7 2
In deciding the few section 110(5) exemption cases that have arisen to
date, the federal courts have examined the factual circumstances suggested
in the legislative history of section 110(5), but have not indicated clearly the
relative significance of any single circumstance to an establishment's exempt
status a. 7 For example, Congress suggested that the size of the area in which
transmission reception occurs within an establishment is significant in deter-
mining the applicability of section 110(5). 74 Both the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit and the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California have examined the size of the establishments
in determining the availability of an exemption under section 110(5) . 7 In
67. See id. (§ 110(5) exemption does not apply to establishments employing commercial
sound systems).
68. See id. (§ 110(5) does not apply to establishments employing sophisticated or extensive
amplification equipment to convert home-quality equipment into equivalent of commercial
sound system).
69. See 1976 HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 87 (circumstances significant in determining
applicability of § 110(5) exemption).
70. See 1976 HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 87 (circumstances significant in determining
applicability of § 110(5) exemption); see also infra notes 85 and accompanying text (review of
cases arising under § 110(5) in which courts have examined size of establishment to determine
exempt status); infra notes 89-94 and accompanying text (review of cases arising under § 110(5)
in which courts have examined physical arrangement of establishment to determine exempt
status); infra notes 96-100 and accompanying text (review of case arising under § 110(5) in
which court implicitly examined noise level of establishment to determine exempt status).
71. See 1976 HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 87 (providing no indication of relative
significance of suggested circumstances to exemption under § 110(5)).
72. See infra notes 73-126 and accompanying text (review of case precedent relating to §
110(5) exemption and demonstrating federal courts' exercise of discretion in determining
applicability of § 110(5) to reception of radio broadcasts).
73. See infra notes 74-108 and accompanying text (review of case precedent relating to §
110(5) exemption and demonstrating federal courts' inconsistency in finding particular circum-
stances determinative of copyright liability).
74. See 1976 HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 87 (suggesting size of establishment as
circumstance significant to exemption under § 110(5)).
75. See Sail or Music v. The Gap Stores, 668 F.2d at 84, 86 (2d Cir. 1981) (noting square
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Sailor Music v. The Gap Stores, Inc.,7 6 seven owners of copyrighted music
brought suit against The Gap Stores, Inc. (The Gap), a chain of about 420
clothing stores." Although the copyright owners alleged that two Gap stores
located in New York City had performed copyrighted musical works without
authorization, only the performance of copyrighted music at one of the
stores was at issue on appeal to the Second Circuit.7 8 The store in question
had an area of 2769 square feet.7 9 The Gap Stores Court reviewed the
congressional intent underlying the section 110(5) exemption reflected in the
legislative history. 80 The Gap Stores Court noted that Congress had intended
that the restaurant in Aiken, with an area of 1055 square feet, represent the
outer limit of the section 110(5) exemption. 8' The Second Circuit thus found
that the 2769 square foot Gap store exceeded the outer limit of section
110(5), and affirmed the district court's decision that The Gap had infringed
the copyright owners' exclusive performance rights.8 2 In Laminations Music
v. P & X Markets, Inc.,83 the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California followed the reasoning of the Second Circuit in Gap
Stores that Aiken's 1055 square foot restaurant represented the boundary of
an exempt establishment.84 The P & X Markets Court found that six grocery
stores ranging in size from 10,000 to 145,000 square feet were not small
commercial establishments and therefore held that the grocery chain was not
exempt from liability under section 110(5).85
footage of area in which radio reception occurred in establishment); Laminations Music v. P &
X Markets, Inc., 1985 COPYIGHT L. REP at 25,790 (same); see also infra notes 76-85 and
accompanying text (review of cases in which courts have examined size of establishment to
determine exempt status).
76. 668 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 945 (1982).
77. Id. at 85.
78. See id. (indicating that performance at only one store was at issue on appeal to
Second Circuit). The district court record in Sailor Music v. The Gap Stores, Inc. indicates that
performances of copyrighted musical works at two stores were in question in the lower court.
See Sailor Music v. The Gap Stores, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 923, 923-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) aff'd, 668
F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1981). The Second Circuit did not indicate a reason for the change. See Gap
Stores, 668 F.2d at 85-86.
79. Gap Stores, 668 F.2d at 86. In Sailor Music v. The Gap Stores, Inc., the sound system
of the store in question consisted of four speakers recessed behind wire grids in the store's
ceiling and connected to a receiver by built-in wiring. See id. at 85-86.
80. See id. at 86 (noting congressional intent regarding scope of § 110(5) exemption
reflected in legislative history).
81. See id. (noting congressional intent that Aiken's restaurant represented boundary of
§ 110(5) exemption).
82. Id.
83. 1985 CoPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 25,790 (N.D. Cal. April 24, 1985). In Laminations
Music v. P & X Markets, Inc., a group of copyright owners brought an action against a chain
of small grocery stores and a stockholder who was the principal corporate officer of the chain.
See id. The copyright owners alleged that six of the chain's stores had performed copyrighted
musical works without a license from ASCAP, the performing rights society of which all the
owners were members. See id.
84. See id. (noting congressional intent regarding scope of § 110(5) exemption).
85. Id.
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In addition to the size of the area in which transmission reception occurs
within an establishment, Congress also indicated the importance of the
physical arrangement of the equipment in the area in which the transmission
reception takes place.8 6 The legislative history of section 110(5), in describing
the fact situation in Aiken, provides some insight into the physical arrange-
ment to which the section 110(5) exemption should applyY Congress noted
that Aiken had connected the receiving set in his restaurant to four ordinary
loudspeakers grouped in close proximity to the receiving set.a8 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California have examined the location of
loudspeakers with respect to a receiving set and have indicated that certain
arrangements of equipment resulted in the equivalent of a commercial sound
system.8 9 For example, in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. United States Shoe
Corp.,90 the Ninth Circuit found that an arrangement of equipment consisting
of four or more speakers mounted in the ceiling and connected to a single
radio receiver amounted to a commercial quality sound system as a matter
of law. 9' Accordingly, the United States Shoe Court held that the quality of
the sound system placed the stores involved beyond the scope of the section
110(5) exemption, and affirmed the district court's grant of injunctive relief
for unauthorized performance of copyrighted music.9 2 After examining the
sound systems in the six grocery stores, the United States District Court for
the Northern District of California in Laminations Music v. P & X Markets,
Inc.,93 held that a receiver connected to six to ten ceiling-mounted speakers
spread widely throughout the public selling area resulted in a sound system
comparable to a commercial sound system.9 4 The P & X Markets Court also
86. See 1976 HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 87 (circumstances significant to exemption
under § 110(5)).
87. See 1976 HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 87 (implying physical arrangement of
sound system to which § 110(5) exemption should apply).
88. See supra note 87 and accompanying text (legislative history implied physical arrange-
ment of sound system to which § 110(5) exemption should apply); Twentieth Century Music
Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 152 (1975). (Aiken's restaurant featured radio with outlets to
four speakers in ceiling).
89. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. United States Shoe, 678 F.2d 816, 817-18 (9th Cir. 1982).
(arrangement of sound equipment in establishment constituted commercial sound system); P &
X Markets, 1985 COPYRIGHT L. REP. at 25,790 (same); see also infra notes 89-94 and
accompanying text (review of cases in which courts have examined physical arrangement of
sound system in establishment to determine exempt status).
90. 678 F.2d 816 (9th Cir. 1982). In Broadcast Music, Inc. v. United States Shoe Corp.,
a performing rights society brought an action against a chain of more than 600 women's apparel
stores doing business as Casual Corner. See id. at 817; see also supra note 38 and accompanying
text (discussion of performing rights society). Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI) alleged that unau-
thorized performances of copyrighted music had taken place in four Casual Corner stores. See
United States Shoe, 678 F.2d at 817.
91. See United States Shoe, 678 F.2d at 817-18 (affirming district court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of Broadcast Music, Inc.).
92. Id.
93. 1985 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 25,790 (N.D. Cal. April 24, 1985).
94. See id. (district court held that arrangement of equipment in six grocery stores
amounted to commercial sound system).
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noted that the brand names of the equipment used in the grocery stores
indicated that the equipment was not the type commonly used in private
homes and therefore placed the stores beyond the scope of section 110(5). 95
While the United States District Court for the Middle District of North
Carolina also considered the size and the physical arrangement of the
premises in Springsteen v. Plaza Roller Dome, Inc.,96 the Plaza Roller Dome
Court distinguished the miniature golf course involved in the case from the
commercial establishments involved in the Gap Stores and United States
Shoe decisions. 97 The Plaza Roller Dome Court found that the outdoor
setting of the miniature golf course, together with the poor quality of the
speakers, contributed to sound distortion uncharacteristic of a sophisticated
sound system. 9s Based on the notion that the quality of radio reception was
equally as important as the size and physical arrangement of the miniature
golf course, the Plaza Roller Dome Court found that the owners of the
miniature golf course were not liable for copyright infringement because of
the poor quality of the music played.99 Thus, the Plaza Roller Dome Court
first considered the effect of the outdoor setting of the miniature golf course
on the quality of radio reception and then determined the applicability of
95. See id. (finding that "Vocall" and "Radio Shack" brand receivers and speakers did
not constitute home-quality equipment).
96. 602 F. Supp. 1113 (M.D.N.C. 1985). In Springsteen v. Plaza Roller Dome, Inc., ten
copyright owners alleged that an outdoor miniature golf course, which was adjacent to and part
of a roller rink complex, had performed copyrighted musical compositions without authoriza-
tion. See id. at 1114. The dispute with the copyright owners was the result of a misunderstanding
between the roller rink complex and ASCAP, which licensed the musical compositions in
question. See id.; supra note 38 and accompanying text (discussion of ASCAP). The roller rink
complex had entered into a written agreement with ASCAP that gave the roller rink complex
the privilege of performing the musical compositions of ASCAP members for a payment of
$300.00 per year. See 602 F. Supp. at 1114. Plaza Roller Dome, Inc. (Plaza Roller Dome)
believed that the agreement permitting performance of the musical compositions covered both
the roller rink and the miniature golf course areas of the Plaza Roller Dome complex. See id.
ASCAP claimed that the agreement covered only the roller rink. See id. When ASCAP demanded
an additional fee to license the miniature golf course, Plaza Roller Dome refused to pay. See
id. The copyright owners brought an infringement action, and the roller rink complex filed a
counterclaim against ASCAP alleging state law causes of action for fraud, deceit, intentional
harassment, and unfair trade practice. See id.
97. See Plaza Roller Dome, 602 F. Supp. at 1118 (finding that outdoor setting of miniature
golf course and poor quality of speakers resulted in distorted sound). Cf. United States Shoe,
678 F.2d at 817-18 (chain of stores liable for infringement of exclusive performance right related
to copyrighted musical works); Sailor Music v. The Gap Stores Inc., 668 F.2d 84, 86 (same)
(2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 945 (1982).
98. Plaza Roller Dome, 602 F. Supp. at 1118. In Plaza Roller Dome, the miniature golf
course had played music for its customers over a radio and speaker system, consisting of a
radio receiver wired to six separate speakers, each mounted on a light pole. See id. at 1114.
The light poles covered 7500 square feet of outdoor area. See id. The six speakers covering
7500 square feet of area were not in close proximity to the receiving set. See id. The United
States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina noted that the 7500 square foot
area of the miniature golf course and the physical arrangement of the sound system would
place the establishment outside the literal scope of the § 110(5) exemption. See id. at 1117.
99. See id. at 1119 (granting summary judgment in favor of Plaza Roller Dome, Inc.).
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the section 110(5) exemption based on the quality of the radio reception.' °°
Although Congress did not suggest the quality of transmission reception
among the circumstances to consider in applying the section 110(5) exemp-
tion, the reference in the legislative history of section 110(5) to the noise
level of the area within an establishment in which transmission reception
occurs indicates some congressional concern with the quality of radio recep-
tion.11
In elaborating on the type of commercial establishments to which the
section 110(5) exemption should apply, Congress indicated that the establish-
ment should not be able to afford a subscription to a commercial background
music service. 0 2 Accordingly, the courts in every case arising under section
110(5) have examined the feasibility of an establishment's subscription to a
commercial background music service.0 3 In Sailor Music v. The Gap Stores,
Inc., the Second Circuit agreed with the district court that the clothing store
100. See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text (Plaza Roller Dome court considered
effect of physical arrangement of sound system on quality of radio reception at miniature golf
course).
101. See 1976 HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 87 (suggesting noise level of establishment
as circumstance significant to exemption under § 110(5)).
102. See H.R. REP. No. 1733, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 75 (reflecting congressional intent
expressed in 1976 House Report regarding scope of § 110(5) exemption), reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5816 [hereinafter cited as 1976 CONFERENCE REPORT]. The
Conference Report on the 1976 Act generally reflected the congressional intent expressed in the
1976 House Report. See id. The 1976 Conference Report explained that § 110(5) would exempt
from liability small commercial establishments, such as Aiken's restaurant, which employed
home-quality receiving equipment; but the Conference Report added that the establishments
must be unable to afford a subscription to a commercial background music service. See id.
A background music service pays the copyright owners of musical works a license fee to
obtain the right to perform the musical works. See Note, The Meaning of "Performance,"
supra note 17, at 707 n.l 1 (explaining function of background music service). The background
music service in turn receives fees from subscribing establishments to provide an uninterrupted
program of music. See id. The Muzak Corporation (Muzak) is probably the best-known
background music service. See id. During the Aiken case, after arguing Aiken's cause as amicus
curiae in the district court, Muzak provided legal representation for Aiken in his appeal to the
Third Circuit. See Korman, Performance Rights in Music Under Section 110 and 118 of the
1976 Copyright Act, 22 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 521, 529 (1977) (noting Muzak's involvement in
Aiken). A decision in Aiken's favor would reinforce Muzak's argument in pending litigation
concerning the allegedly unreasonable amount of the licensing fees that Muzak paid to the
copyright owners of musical works. See id. at 529-30. Muzak wished to argue that because
Muzak had to compete with the free commercial performance of music in small establishments,
Muzak was entitled to a reduction in the licensing fees paid to the copyright owners. See M.
N1MMER, supra note 18, § 8.18, at 8-204 (explaining Muzak's interest in outcome of Aiken).
103. See Broadcast Music Inc. v. United States Shoe Corp., 678 F.2d 816, 817 (9th Cir.
1982) (noting that subscription to commercial background music service was justified). Sailor
Music v. The Gap Stores, Inc. 668 F.2d 84, 86 (2d Cir. 1981) (same); cert. denied, 456 U.S.
945 (1982). Laminations Music v. P & X Markets, Inc. 1985 COPYRiGHT L. REP. (CCH) 25,790
(N.D. Cal. April 24, 1985) (same); Springsteen v. Plaza Roller Dome, Inc. 602 F. Supp. at
1113, 1118-19 (M.D.N.C. 1985) (finding subscription to commercial background music service
infeasible); see also infra notes 104-108 and accompanying text (review of cases in which courts
examined feasibility of subscription to commercial background music service).
COPYRIGHTS AND BACKGROUND MUSIC
in question was of a sufficient size to justify subscription to a commercial
background music service.1 4 In Broadcast Music, Inc. v. United States Shoe
Corp., the Ninth Circuit also held that the size and nature of the chain
operation involved in the case justified subscription to a commercial back-
ground music service.'10 Noting that two stores in the chain already had
employed a background music service, the United States District Court for
the Northern District of California in Laminations Music v. P & X Markets,
Inc. held that the chain of small grocery stores was of a sufficient size to
justify subscription to a background music service for the six remaining
stores in the chain.1°6 The inability to subscribe to a background music
service was a reinforcing circumstance in the United States District Court
for the Middle District of North Carolina's finding of no copyright infringe-
ment liability in Springsteen v. Plaza Roller Dome, Inc.'0 7 In holding that
the miniature golf course was exempt under section 110(5), the Plaza Roller
Dome Court had noted that the establishment's total annual revenues prohi-
bited subscription to a background music service. 08
In addition to giving no clear indication of the relative significance of
any given circumstance to an establishment's possible exempt status, the
federal courts have made arbitrary and subjective determinations in connec-
tion with several of the circumstances suggested in the legislative history of
section 110(5).'0 9 For example, the legislative history of section 110(5) stated
that Congress intended Aiken's restaurant to represent the outer limit of the
section 110(5) exemption, but made specific reference only to the number of
speakers in an establishment's sound system." 0 The Gap Stores Court and
the P & X Markets Court noted the congressional intent behind section
110(5), compared the square footages of the public selling areas in the
respective establishments to the square footages of Aiken's restaurant, and
104. See Gap Stores, 668 F.2d at 86 (finding that clothing store was of sufficient size to
justify subscription to background music service).
105. See United States Shoe, 678 F.2d at 817 (finding that size and nature of women's
apparel chain justified presumption that chain could subscribe to background music service).
106. 1985 COPYRIGHT L. REP. at 25,790 (noting that two stores in grocery chain employed
background music service).
107. 602 F. Supp. 1113, 1119 (M.D.N.C. 1985).
108. See id. at 1119 (comparing annual revenues of miniature golf course to presumably
substantial annual revenues of Aiken's fast food business). In Springsteen v. Plaza Roller
Dome, Inc., the district court for the Middle District of North Carolina noted that the miniature
golf course operated for only six months of every year at maximum monthly revenues of $1000
per month. See id. The Plaza Roller Dome Court looked only at the revenues of the miniature
golf course and not at the revenues of the entire Plaza Roller Dome complex. See id. the Plaza
Roller Dome court reasoned that if ASCAP sought to treat the miniature golf course separately
for licensing purposes, the court also would adopt separate treatment to determine the applic-
ability of § 110(5). See id. at 1119 n.6.
109. See infra notes 110-26 and accompanying text (review of case precedent demonstrating
circumstances requiring courts to make arbitrary and subjective determinations).
110. See 1976 HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 87 (implying that radio with outlets to
four speakers in ceiling represented outer limit of § 110(5) exemption).
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concluded that the establishments were not exempt under section 110(5)."'
Because the Gap Stores and P & X Markets courts findings regarding size
do not reflect express congressional intent, the findings represent little more
than arbitrary determinations of square footages that place an establishment
beyond the scope of section 110(5).' 2 In addition, the result of the Gap
Stores and P & X Markets holdings is to create a wide range of objectionable
square footages that does not provide a reliable indication of potential
copyright infringement liability."'
In examining the physical arrangement of the equipment in the area in
which radio reception occurred within an establishment, the courts have
provided another example of an arbitrary determination. ' 4 The legislative
history of section 110(5) suggested that Aiken's restaurant, which employed
four speakers connected and located in close proximity to a single receiving
set, represented the boundary of the section 110(5) exemption.' The P & X
Markets and United States Shoe courts examined the number of ceiling-
mounted speakers located in the respective establishments, but the courts
gave no consistent indication of the number of speakers that placed an
establishment beyond the scope of section 110(5).' 16 While the P & X Markets
Court found that a receiver connected to six to ten ceiling-mounted speakers
spread widely throughout a public selling area resulted in a sound system
comparable to a commercial system, the United States Shoe Court, found
that as a matter of law a single radio receiver connected to only four ceiling-
mounted speakers resulted in a commercial system.' '1 Thus, the courts also
have failed to provide a reliable indication of possible copyright liability
relative to the physical arrangement of equipment in an establishment.",,
The feasibility of subscription to a commercial background music service
represents yet another example of a circumstance involving arbitrary deter-
111. See Gap Stores, 668 F.2d at 86 (size of establishment placed establishment beyond
scope of § 110(5) exemption); P & X Markets, 1985 COPYRIGHT L. REP. at 25,790 (same).
112. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text (suggesting that Gap Stores and P &
X Markets courts findings based on examination of establishment size may be inaccurate
reflection of congressional intent).
113. See supra note 112 and accompanying text (arbitrary determinations of square footages
prevent certainty regarding potential copyright infringement liability).
114. See infra notes 116-18 and accompanying text (review of cases demonstrating arbitrary
determination related to circumstance of physical arrangement).
115. See 1976 HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 87 (stating congressional intent regarding
scope of § 110(5) exemption and implying physical arrangement to which exemption should
apply).
116. Compare P & X Markets, 1985 COPYRIGHT L. REP. at 25,790 (grocery stores' use
of six to ten ceiling-mounted speakers placed stores beyond scope of § 110(5) exemption) with
United States Shoe, 678 F.2d at 817-18 (clothing store's use of four ceiling-mounted speakers
placed store beyond scope of § 110(5) exemption).
117. See supra note 116 and accompanying text (P & X Markets and United States Shoe
courts provided notably different views of physical arrangement of sound system to which §
110(5) did not apply).
118. See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text (arbitrary determinations related to
physical arrangement of equipment prevent certainty regarding potential copyright infringement
liability).
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mination." 9 The Gap Stores, United States Shoe, and P & X Markets courts
indicated merely that the respective establishments had the financial resources
to subscribe to a background music service.' 2 The Plaza Roller Dome Court,
while suggesting that $6000 annual revenues placed the miniature golf course
within the scope of section 110(5), gave no indication of the level of revenues
beyond which an establishment would not be exempt.'
2'
In addition to the arbitrary determination regarding speaker numbers
and annual revenues, the consideration of a sound system's commercial
quality involves a subjective evaluation."" The district court record in Gap
Stores demonstrates the subjective nature of the consideration. 23 In Gap
Stores, both parties to the litigation offered expert testimony in the district
court concerning the likelihood of the sound system's use in a private home.' 24
Because the parties' experts disagreed about the possible use of the Gap
Stores equipment in a home, the district court refused to grant either party's
motion for summary judgment regarding copyright infringement liability.
25
In focusing on the quality of the radio reception at the miniature golf course,
the Plaza Roller Dome Court also engaged in a subjective determination
when the court found that the radio music at the miniature golf course had
a distorted sound.' 26 For example, while the quality of the sound might be
poor in circumstances where music is a central feature, where the same music
is merely background music, the quality might be rather good due to
decreased listener expectations. The quality of sound is therefore subject to
changing standards.
The lack of specificity in the legislative history of section 110(5) has
forced courts to determine the applicability of the exemption based on any
circumstance on a case by case basis.' 27 Until legislative action clarifies the
specific circumstances that are determinative of exempt status under section
119. See supra notes 103-08 and accompanying text (review of cases demonstrating arbitrary
determinations related to feasibility of subscription to background music service.
120. See supra notes 107-12 and accompanying text (review of cases that provided no
specific indication of revenue level at which subscription to background music service becomes
feasible).
121. See Plaza Roller Dome, 602 F. Supp. at 1119 (noting that total annual revenues of
miniature golf course prohibited subscription to background music service).
122. See infra notes 123-25 and accompanying text (discussion of subjective nature of
considerations related to commercial quality of equipment).
123. See Gap Stores, 516 F. Supp. at 925 (refusing to grant motions for summary judgment
because of experts' disagreement regarding quality of sound system).
124. Id.
125. See id. (recognizing subjective nature of considerations related to commercial quality
of equipment). The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit subsequently affirmed
the district court's refusal to grant either party's motion for summary judgment. Gap Stores,
668 F.2d at 86.
126. See Plaza Roller Dome, 602 F. Supp. at 1118 (finding that outdoor setting of miniature
golf course and poor quality of speakers at course resulted in distorted sound).
127. See supra notes 73-108 and accompanying text (review of case precedent relating to §
110(5) exemption and demonstrating case by case determination of applicability of § 110(5) to
radio broadcasts).
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110(5), federal courts should strive to identify common circumstances in
cases arising under section 110(5) that would minimize arbitrary or subjective
determinations of the applicability of the exemption.2 2 For example, a
common characteristic of the section 110(5) cases decided to date is the
tendency of the courts to find that section 110(5) did not apply to establish-
ments that are part of a chain. 29 Both the Gap Stores and United States
Shoe courts found that section 110(5) did not apply to chains of clothing
stores, and the P & X Markets Court held that a chain of small grocery
stores was not exempt under section 110(5).130 Although consideration of
whether an establishment is part of a chain might represent a simplistic
approach to determining an establishment's exemption under section 110(5),
the approach is appealing in several respects.' Most significantly, the chain
store approach would effectuate the congressional intent that the section
110(5) exemption apply to small commercial establishments. 3 2 The chain
store approach also may reflect the position of the performing rights societies
that the use of radio broadcasting in small "Mom and Pop" establishments
is insignificant and does not require licensing when only a home-quality
radio receiver and no additional loudspeakers are in use.' 33 In addition, the
chain store approach would incorporate several of the suggested circumstan-
ces significant to section 110(5) determinations. 3 4 For example, an establish-
ment that is part of a chain presumably has access to sufficient funds to
provide for a sound system of greater sophistication than home-quality
equipment or, alternatively, to subscribe to a commercial background music
128. See infra notes 129-37 and accompanying text (discussion of approach to copyright
liability under § 110(5) that would not involve arbitrary and subjective determinations).
129. See United States Shoe, 678 F.2d at 817-18 (affirming district court's grant of summary
judgment against chain of women's apparel stores); Gap Stores, 668 F.2d at 86 (chain of
clothing stores had infringed exclusive performance right of copyright owners of musical works);
P & X Markets, 1985 CoPYRIGHT L. REP. at 25,790 (holding that chain of small grocery
stores was not exempt from copyright liability under § 110(5)).
130. See supra note 129 and accompanying text (discussion of tendency of courts to find
§ 110(5) exemption inapplicable to establishments belonging to chain).
131. See infra notes 132-37 and accompanying text (discussion of advantages to adopting
chain store approach in determining exemption under § 110(5). Although adoption of the chain
store approach in determining exempt status under § 110(5) would offer several advantages, the
approach would not address effectively all of the possible circumstances to which § 110(5) is
applicable. For example, an establishment that is not associated with a chain might employ a
sophisticated sound system and might generate sufficient revenues to justify subscription to a
commercial background music service.
132. See 1976 HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 87 (reflecting congressional intent that §
110(5) exemption apply to small commercial establishments).
133. See Korman, supra note 102, at 528 n.32 (citing Brief for Petitioners at 8-9, Aiken,
422 U.S. 151 (1975)) (suggesting ASCAP's position opposing potential copyright liability of
small commercial establishments).
134. See infra note 135 and accompanying text (suggesting circumstances significant to §
110(5) that chain store approach incorporates). Whether an establishment employed a sound
system of greater sophistication than home-quality equipment or whether the establishment
subscribed to a background music service are circumstances that also would affect the resulting
quality of the radio reception.
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service.' 35 Finally, the issue of whether a given establishment is part of a
chain involves an objective determination and therefore, the applicability of
section 110(5) using the chain store approach would not require determination
on a case by case basis. 36 Thus, if the federal courts were to adopt the chain
store approach, commercial establishments that wished to provide back-
ground music for customer enjoyment easily could determine potential
copyright liability for infringement of the exclusive performance right.' 37
Despite judicial inconsistency and subjectivity concerning the circum-
stances that are determinative of copyright infringement liability, the deci-
sions in the few cases relating to section 110(5) have been equitable. 37 Thus,
a judicial decision has not prompted Congress to amend section 110(5) of
the 1976 Act with more specific language regarding circumstances determi-
native of exempt status.'3 8 Only a decision with the impact of Twentieth
Century Music Corp. v. Aiken in revealing a flaw in the federal copyright
scheme is likely to trigger further legislative action concerning the section
110(5) exemption.'3 9
LAURA A. MISNER*
135. See 1976 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 102, at 75 (suggesting inability to subscribe
to background music service as circumstance significant to exemption under § 110(5)).
136. See supra note 127 and accompanying text (asserting that vagueness of legislative
history of § 110(5) forces case by case determination of exemption).
137. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (asserting that judicial inconsistency and
subjectivity in determining exemption contribute to uncertainty in determing potential copyright
liability).
138. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text (noting that courts did not apply §
110(5) exemption to establishments having alternatives other than turning off radio to avoid
potential copyright infringement liability); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S.
at 151, 162-63 (1975) (noting that small commercial establishments must keep radio turned off
to avoid possible infringing performance of copyrighted musical work).
139. See supra 32-62 and accompanying text (tracing congressional response to Supreme
Court holdings in Aiken).* This note has been submitted to the 1986 Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition.
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